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ABSTRACT

The Punctuated Equilibrium Model of Policy Evolution: an Explanation for US
Federal Fire Policy Change

By
Tricia Mynster
Dr. David Hassenzahl, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The organizational structure of federal land management agencies is designed to
function in a static state for long periods of time. Policies in these bureaucracies tend to
follow a punctuated equilibrium pattern of evolution. These policies are accompanied by
reinforcing institutional arrangements and networks that resist changes. In order for
change to occur, a catalyst is needed to cause a drastic change in policy. Following this
change, new institutional arrangements will be created to support the new policy. A
catalyst is needed at the lower levels of the bureaucracy to follow a policy through to
implementation. Using the National Park Service and Yosemite National Park as case
studies it is demonstrated that the punctuated equilibrium model is an accurate
description of policy evolution.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The discovery o f fire has always been considered a monumental accomplishment
of humankind, but fire has always been an integral component of the natural world.
When humans discovered fire, what we really discovered was that we could control fire.
Fire, a destructive force under its own power, could be captured at the whim of humans.
Since that point, humans have put fire to work: cooking, heating, clearing land. We have
also been in a battle with any wild fire that has dared to bum without our consent.
The battle between humans and fire has raged on within our federal government
as well. When federal land agencies were established at the beginning of the twentieth
century, their mission included protecting the land from wild fires. For most of that
century, the federal government brought all of their resources to bear against fires
burning in national forests and parks. As scientific understanding grew regarding the role
fire played in an ecosystem’s development, the government reconsidered its relationship
with fire.
The official policy for the National Park Service changed in 1968 from
suppression of all fires to recognition that fire was an ecological process that needed to be
allowed in the parks. It has been almost forty years since that policy change, but there
has been a significant delay in the implementation of the policy within the parks
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themselves. Why do some parks take up the challenge of the new policy while other
parks adhered to the outdated practices of the old policy? How much strength does a
federal mandate carry for the management of individual parks? Could the bureaucratic
structure of the land management agencies be inhibiting the implementation of the
policy?

This paper compares fire policy at the local and national level to assess how
policies evolve. Yosemite National Park will serve as a case study site to evaluate
whether the punctuated equilibrium model of policy evolution describes policy changes
at ither or both levels. This thesis is organized as follows. The introduction explains
punctuated equilibrium theory of policy evolution and describes the history of fire
management policy. Next, the methods section illustrates how historical research will be
conducted to track policy changes, and how these observed changes will evaluated to
rmine if a punctuated equilibrium pattern is reflected in the history. The results
section narrates the policy histories at the federal and park level. Those narrations are
interpreted in the discussions chapter to assess the hypothesis that the punctuated
equilibrium model explains policy formations at all levels of federal land management.
This final chapter will also discuss what catalysts prompt changes at the different levels.

Policy Theory
Political scientists discuss policy in terms of rational choice, power structures,
networking groups, and socioeconomic influences.' These frameworks aid in studying
how ideas are spread or promoted, but these theories are smaller components of the larger
' Peter John. “Is there Life After Policy Streams, Advocacy Coalitions, and Punctuations: Using
Evolutionary Theory to Explain Policy Change?” The Policy Studies Jowrna/ 31(2003): 481-96.
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context of policy change. Comparing policy change to the theory of evolution that
explains change in species over time is a more comprehensive method of analysis.
Evolution is a process whereby the dominant characteristics represented in a gene
pool changes. There is a dominant gene and then a mutation occurs. The mutation is
selected, replicated through the reproductive process, and expands throughout the gene
pool until it becomes the dominant gene. Policies evolve similarly in that there is a
dominant policy and then there is a policy change, analogous to a mutation. Policy
changes can occur through a recombination of ideas or through a random event that
draws attention to another policy alternative.^ The new policy is selected, implemented,
and becomes the new guiding principle for future courses of action.
An alternative theory of policy evolution would be one of incremental change.^
According to this theory, policies and their consequences are often too complex to be
fully understood by decision makers. Because of this complexity, only one aspect of a
policy can be examined and changed at a time. Each time a policy gains a spot on an
agenda, it receives some measure of reform that adds up to a large change over a long
period o f time. Changes are made incrementally because they still use and are based on
the current policy. Federal fire policy does not reflect this model of policy evolution. In
the case o f fire management, the change was a drastic reversal of policy. While there
were smaller changes in thinking and disagreement about how fires should be managed
on federal lands throughout the history of the National Park Service, those changes were
not reflected in the policy until they were unified in some form of a catalyst that caused a

Uohn, 491.
^ Charles Linblum, “The Science o f ‘Muddling Through.’” Public Administration Review 19 (1959):79-
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punctuation in the policy. Federal fire policy is an example of the punctuated equilibrium
model.
It is important to recognize the organizational structure of federal land
management agencies to understand how directives are implemented at the park level.
Federal agencies are organized as a bureaucracy. Policies in a bureaucracy are dictated
down a hierarchical chain of command through fixed procedures to many offices and
departments. Within the structure of hierarchically arranged authority, personnel
decisions are governed by general rules"'. All problems requiring a decision are
categorized and dealt with based on the rules for that classification. This process
precludes the need for issuing specific orders for individual cases. It also limits the
decision process so that it is based on past decisions that established precedents for that
category. In this marmer, policies remain static.
The hierarchical structure of these bureaucracies assumes that lower level offices
will follow rules mandated to them from offices higher in the organization. However, the
diversity of lands, and the expertise and discretion possessed by lower level bureaucrats
in the National Park Service, gives each field office a measure of autonomy. Policies do
not flow through bureaucracies from policy to practice the minute a new policy is
released. A separate impetus is needed to force the implementation of a policy change.
The policy change in the higher offices simply authorizes lower offices to change their
current practices, but it does not necessarily give them motivation to do so.
The punctuated equilibrium theory elaborates on policy evolution by explaining
that policies will continue along an initial pattern, resistant to change, and attracting little

Robert K. Merton. “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality” in Classics o f Public Administration. Eds.
Jay M. Shaffitz and Albert C. Hyde (Orlando: Harcourt Brace and Company) 100
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attention while public focus changes to newly emerging political issues. Eventually a
mutation or focusing event serves as a catalyst to draw attention to a new policy
alternative^. In the punctuated equilibrium model policies are reinforced with policy
networks and monopolies that control resources for specific policies. A policy network is
a coalition o f agencies and individuals that influence decisions in a given policy arena.^
Alternative policies may not have access to the resources controlled by these institutions,
and in this manner are excluded before they can become new policies. •
A punctuation in policy evolution can be graphed as an S-curve. A line that does
not change with time would represent the established policy with its supporting
institutional arrangements. A catalytic event would cause the jump, or punctuation, to a
new equilibrium where a new policy monopoly would form to support the new point of
stasis (see Figure 1).
Often, problems that are addressed in the form of public policy are too large for
the policy maker to completely comprehend. Fixed on one facet of a problem,
policymakers fail to see the systemic reaction to a policy. Advances in science and
technology may proceed faster than the government process of policy review and reform.
Policies tend to fixate on one aspect of a multi-faceted problem, which may lead to
aggravating the problem the policy was originally intended to fix’. However, the existing
institutions supporting the flawed policy make it difficult to correct.

^James L. True, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, “Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Exnlainine
Stability and Change in American Policymaking,” in Theories o f the Policy Process, ed. Paul A Sabatier
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 91-113.
®George Busenberg, “Innovation, Learning, and Policy Evolution in Hazardous Systems”, American
Behavioral Scientist. 44 no. 4 (2000): 679-691.
’ True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 103.
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Figure 1. Pattern of Punctuated Equilibrium Model

The federal agencies that manage public lands are bureaucratic. They are
designed to govern a large agenda by limiting the role of each member of the
organization to a particular function. Most bureaucratic offices involve the expectation
of long-life tenure, in the absence of disturbing factors. Vocational security provided to
employees ensures devotion to the organization despite external pressures*.
Federal agencies align their employees in a manner so that personal preferences of
employees match the agency’s objectives. Uniforms, similar educational backgrounds
and training, and high transfer rates are designed so that employees identify themselves
with the federal agency, not the local community. ^ These techniques are meant to foster
unity across the agency despite distance between locations and influences of local
population. These socialization methods exist in bureaucracies to dissuade any differing
personal preferences a person might have when entering the organization. In this manner,
bureaucracies reinforce existing policies.
Federal jobs are highly sought after because job security is guaranteed, but
without rapid advancement. Once a job is secured, an employee could perform the same
function everyday without any change in pay or benefits. This structure is meant to
ensure consistent performance from the employees, but it also limits any initiative the
employee may have. Even if a member of the bureaucracy displays innovation in their
work, there is no reward. The rational choice model of how individuals behave in an
organization shows that without reward, employees do not exert the extra effort to follow

Merton, 100.
’ Herbert Kaufman. The Forest Ranger. John Hopkins Press. 1960: 161-200. This whole chapters describes
the methods by which the Forest Service recruits and trains men so that they willftilly follow orders and
have the expertise to do so. The preceding chapter discusses the feedback loops in place in the
organization’s structure to detect and discourage deviation within the agency.
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up on new ideas'®. A lack of incentives serves the greater bureaucracy by ensuring
stability and consistency towards the established policy outcome.
While bureaucratic structures function in a top-down allocation of power, the
reality of large organizations do allow for a significant amount of discretion in the lower
levels of the agencies. The power of this discretion provides an avenue where catalytic
changes can occur. A manager at the field office level has a certain amount of autonomy
to implement plans and policies as he sees fit. When taken together, the individual
decisions o f these workers become, or add up to, agency policy. ' ' Field level managers
are still subject to directives from above, but the amount of their discretion gives them
power of local policy. They are relatively free from supervision or scrutiny from
supervisors or constituents.'’
The number of responsibilities assigned to the field level manager outweighs the
resources he or she is given to do them. As a result, a field manager must prioritize
policies based on the preferences he or she brings to the office. Some policies will have
favor with the manager while others that the manager personally disagrees with will be
neglected. The local expertise that is crucial to successfully implementing policies also
protects a ranger’s authority from higher-level figures in the organization since they do
not possess working knowledge of the land to operate the office without the ranger.
An example o f the power of the site superintendent is seen in Colonel John White,
superintendent o f Sequoia National Park during the 1920’s. Despite the policy that fire

'®Charles Barnard, “The Economy o f Incentives”, in Classics o f Organization Theorv. eds. Jay M. Shafritz
and J. Steven Ott (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2001) 93-102.
' ' Michael Lipsky, “Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Critical Role o f the Street-Level Bureaucrats” in
Classics o f Public Administration, eds. Jay M. Shaffitz and Albert C. Hyde (San Diego: Harcourt Brace,
1997) 401-408.
Michael Lipsky, “Street Level Bureaucrats as Policy Makers”, The Political Environment o f Public
Management. (San Francisco: Addison-Wesley) 89-100.
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was to be suppressed, he publicly supported prescribed burning, which at the time was
called light burning.'* Because of the respect he had earned during his long tenure with
the park he was not punished even though he directly defied the dominant philosophy
governing the agency regarding fire at the time. He was simply denounced as a
dissenting voice in the face of the federal policy of suppression.'"*
Field managers need discretion to allocate resources based on the needs of
different lands. Agency-wide policies will have different applications to different field
offices. For instance, all national parks must have a fire plan, but while some plans
include such specialized practices as prescribed bums, fuel treatments, etc., others simply
state that the local municipal fire station is responsible for responding to any fires onsite.
National agencies recognize the power of the field office manager and admit to a
decentralized administration, but agency wide mandates and hierarchical stmctures still
make it a bureaucracy. Despite the methods of integrating the diverse rangers into the
agency in a manner to preserve its integrity as a nationwide organization, the power of
the field office cannot be overlooked as a significant aspect of policy change and
implementation.
Policies are only effective if they come with the resources to implement, maintain,
and enforce them. Symbolic policies are made that show a support for an idea, but do not
follow through with budget appropriations. National Parks get fire management funding
through FIREPRO, a program that forecasts in which parks fire resources will be needed

Stephen J Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History o f Wildland and Rural Fire. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982) 297.
Hal Rothman, manuscript for A Test o f Adversity and Strength: Wildland Fire in the National Park
System . (forthcoming administrative history, NPS) 91.
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from year to year based on past fire histories, weather trends, and fire plans.’* While
funds are available for prescribed bums through FIREPRO, it rests upon the park
superintendent and fire management teams to request the funds for that year. Funds are
not automatically allocated for bum plans to each park. In this manner, the budget needed
to implement bum plans depends on the enthusiasm of the park personnel to go out and
secure the funds or supplement them with general park funds.
In addition to the constraints a bureaucratic organization imposes on policy
changes, federal land agencies must obey the National Environmental Protection Act.
The NEPA Act o f 1970 requires that federal agencies evaluate and disclose the
environmental impacts of their proposed actions. As part of this process, comments are
requested from the public. At the end of that comment period, the agency evaluates the
comments and revises the EIS in response to issues raised by these comments. The
agency then issues a final EIS (FEIS), followed by a "record of decision" (ROD) in which
the agency notifies the public of its decision. But the federal courts have mled that NEPA
is a purely procedural statute. Even after preparation of a full EIS, NEPA does not require
any particular decision. It just requires that the agency do the analysis and reporting
required by law.'^ The lengthy studies involved in preparing an EIS can cause policy
gridlock. Additionally, if a citizen group feels that an EIS was prepared unsatisfactorily
or the NEPA process was sidestepped illegally, they can bring a suit against the agency.
In this way, fire plans can be held up in court for years going back and forth between
agencies and citizen groups.

Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy, Chapter 17:
FIREPRO Analysis, available online at http://www.nps.gov/fire/downioad/fir wil rm l8 chl7.pdf
Reference Manual 18:

accessed 8/16/05. Debra Schweizer, email to author, 13 July 2005.
The NEPA Act o f 1969. Public Law 91-190 (42 U.S. C. 4321-4347) January 1, 1970.

10
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Involved citizens of the local communities are significant in deciding how local
politics play out. When the public shows fear of fire, they can tie up bum plans in court
and prolong the hazardous fuel problem, which is what happened in Arizona in 2002.
Government forest rangers had been fighting local public and environmental groups for
years to thin a forest through commercial logging to reduce the hazardous fuel load.
Three years o f appeals and rebuttals suspended the plan, increasing the hazard of a
catastrophic fire to the very forest the environmental groups were trying to protect. In
June of 2002, 460,000 acres bumed, including some of those that would have been
treated to be more fire resistant, making the court cases moot.” The key factor in this
example was how fire was perceived by the park’s constituents. The first experimental
fire program in the National Park Service occurred in the Everglades where locals
supported fire as part o f the natural setting.’* Fire management plans now include a
portion for educating the public on the benefits of fire to the forest.
In addition to local community action, local events, such as catastrophic fires, can
change field office priorities. Just as the Big Blowup in 1910 changed national fire
policy, local fires, like the Lost Cabin Fire outside of Las Vegas in 2002, can draw
attention to a neglected policy. It was not until after the Lost Cabin fire that the Las
Vegas field office foresters submitted a proposal for new fire management operations in
the Toyabe-Humboldt National Forest’^.
The mission and objectives behind the reasoning that resulted in setting aside each
plot of public land - whether it was for the extractions of raw materials, recreation, or the

” Paul Trachtman, “Fire Fight”, Smithsonian. 34 (5):42-51.
Hal Rothman, manuscript for A Test o f Adversity and Strength: Wildland Fire in the National Park
System (forthcoming administrative history. NPS) 167.
Dewey Warner, interview with author, 6 February 2004.

11
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preservation of natural processes - will affect which policies get a high priority. Since
timber operations mechanically thin forests through the harvesting process, reintroducing
fire to those regions may not be as risky as it would be in a park where fuel loads have
been accumulating without disturbance for 60 years. If conservation of ecological
processes is the mission of the area, réintroduction of fire becomes a priority since it is a
natural occurrence that shapes ecosystems.

Studies have found that visitation from

hikers and mountain bikers changes as areas recover from fire, but how that visitation
changes varies from one region to the next’®. In this respect, managers may have to
decide between maintaining ecological processes and visitor recreation.
This paper will show that the bureaucratic structure of federal land
management agencies, with the supporting networks and monopolies they create, require
a catalytic event for policy change at the federal level. Any change in policy at that level
will need to be followed through with another catalyst for change at the park level where
managers often choose which agency objectives get priority. Historical research will
show change in policy trends and identify which action led to those changes.

Hayley Hesseln, John B Loomis, Armando Gonzalez-Caban, and Susan Alexander, “Wildfire effects on
hiking and biking demand in New Mexico; a travel cost study.” Journal o f Environmental Management. 69
(2003) 359-368; John B. Loomis, J Englin, and Armando Gonzalez-Caban, “Effects o f fire on the economic
value o f forest recreation in the intermountain west: preliminary results,” (USDA Forest Service Gen-TechRep. PSW-GTR-173, 1999) 199-208.

12
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CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY METHODS
Policy dynamics are integrated with value-based deeisions. Because of the
subjeetive nature o f how and why policies are created, a ease study analysis was used for
this study. Case studies allow research to include the context of the variables being
examined while following specified procedures that allow a question to be empirically
investigated within its real life environment. This method is in contrast to a laboratory
method that isolates variables in controlled environments or a statistical analysis that
relies on frequencies. ”
The ease study approach that will be used for this analysis is that of pattern
matching where an empirical pattern is compared with a predicted pattern. Based on the
information collected, graphical patterns will be established for both federal and local fire
policy histories. The graph will have an x-axis representing time, and a y axis that will
represent policy objectives. Those graphical patterns will then be compared to the pattern
established for a policy history that follows the punctuated equilibrium model.
The graphical representation will depend on identifying which factors caused or
inhibit policy changes. The information for the national fire history can be found in
secondary literature, agency management documents available on the Internet, and

Case study methodology was adapted from Robert K. Yin, Applications o f Case Study Research
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003) 3-27.

13
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interviews. Secondary literature included works by Stephen Pyne, one of the principal
authorities on fire history. Most of the literature regarding national fire policy included a
section on Yosemite National Park, highlighting the park’s significance. Many of the
management documents and the director’s orders that dictate Park Service policy are
available on the Internet. The National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho maintains
a website with links to the national fire plan and the various organizations that administer
the joint task o f managing fire in the United States today.
The history o f fire in Yosemite National Park will be collated from primary
sources from the park’s archive, in addition to secondary sources, and interviews. The
park’s archive is located in El Portal with the park administration offices. There is a park
archivist available to help with access to the archive and locating relevant files. There is
also a finding guide for the Yosemite archives that is a good starting point for locating
critical files. The files are organized by topic and year. Forest fire management files are
in files starting with the file code Y 14. There will be a file for each year. Documents are
available to be viewed on site, but only scans or copies can be taken out of the archive.
A variety o f documents can be found in the archive files. Among them were early
superintendent reports, which were narrative accounts of park events with policy
recommendations. They helped to establish not only Yosemite events and considerations,
but also what the federal view on these problems was. They also help to establish the
changing view of fire and whether the opinion was prevalent at the different levels of the
bureaucracy’s organization. All superintendent reports throughout the park’s history are
now available on CD-ROM, and information concerning all aspects of the park’s
operation can be found in them.

14
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As the bureaucratic organization of the Service evolved, it was restructured, as
was the method of annual reporting. Annual fire reports can be found from the 1940’s to
the present, which include statistics on number of fires, causes, new equipment used, and
requests for equipment, training, personnel, etc. There were also comparisons between
fire events o f previous years.
Federal staff writes technical reports on a number of topics for broad circulation.
Some reports are from the Forest Service; however, Yosemite research scientist, Jan van
Wagtendonk, wrote many of the helpful documents himself. Topics included brief
histories of fire policy at Yosemite, case studies of prescribed bums, and discussion of
significant personnel who contributed to the development of the fire program.
Many o f the primary source documents were letters of memorandum between
park employees. The memos were directives from higher offices in the agency, requests
for equipment or training programs, and reports on specific fires in the park. Several
letters included requests for help developing fire programs at other sites, establishing that
Yosemite’s program was used as a model for other locations.
Several past park employees were interviewed to help complete the history of
Yosemite's fire program. I interview Jan van Wagtendonk over the telephone. While he
is no longer an employee for the National Park Service, he does have an office with the
United States Geological Survey at the El Portal administration offices. Hal Rothman
interview Jim Agee and Bob Barbee over the phone while researching his book on the
history of fire policy for the National Park Service. I was able to get the transcribed
interviews from him.

15
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The hypothesis is that the documents will be able to identify catalysts that created
a change in policy at the federal level and a separate set of factors that allowed that policy
to be implemented at the park level. Therefore the predicted pattern is that both policy
evolutions would follow the punctuated equilibrium model as seen in Figure 1.

16
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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Federal policy
Establishing Problem Definition
The United States Forest Service was created in 1905 during Theodore
Roosevelt’s administration. Originally the Forest Service was eharged with proteeting its
reserves from senseless logging and to ensure watershed integrity” . Fire was a
secondary concern. Natural wildland fires were a hazard that had to be endured like
harsh winters and epidemics.” The Forest Service’s 1905 Use Book regulations do not
define a clear fire policy, rather it has guidelines for how fires are to be set, attended, and
extinguished. Fires caused by lightning are refereneed only in a short paragraph within
the patrol section on page 68 of the manual declaring “fires caused by lightning are not
rare, especially in dry mountain regions. After every electric storm a special effort is
needed to locate and extinguish any such fires before they are well under way’"'.”

David Clary, Timber and the Forest Service (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1986).; Harold K.
Steen, “The Origins and Purposes o f the National Forests” in Public Lands.
Public Heritage:The National Forest Idea bv Alfred Runte (Niwot, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1991)
69-77.
Stephen Amo and Steven Allison-Buimell, Flames in Our Forest: Disaster or Renewal? (Washington.
D C.: Island Press, 2002) 15-16.
Gifford Pinchot, The Use o f the National Forest Reserves: Regulations and
Instructions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905) 68.

17
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The fledgling agency quickly changed its policies to reflect a clear priority against
any fire. In 1908, Congress passed an appropriations bill’* that allowed the Forest Service
to receive advanced funds for firefighting emergencies. Through suppression efforts, the
Forest Service was enabled to spend money well beyond its annual appropriations.
Congress gave the Forest Service the budgetary flexibility that was needed to make
suppression work. This type of institutional arrangement reinforced the Forest Service’s
policy.
The Big Blowup of 1910, a two-day wildfire that killed 85 people and bumed
three million acres across Idaho and Montana, acted as a focusing event for fire
protection. The fact that the fire had been a result of traditional light burning practices,
purposefully set fires meant to clear land or propagate certain vegetation types, further
illustrated the hazards of any fire on the land’*. Suppression could be the only policy.
Foresters would remember those fires as a soldier remembers the battles he fought in.
The 1910 fires became the symbol for the Forest Service’s war on fire that held strong as
a national policy for the next 60 years.
Fire protection was defined as an issue of suppression. The focus of policy was
on how to effectively eradicate fire from the forests as opposed how to manage or
mitigate fire effects. Support was gathered for wildland firefighting without
consideration to wildland fuel accumulation or how that would affect forest ecology.
The absence o f fires in wild lands caused for an increase in brash and small trees. This
type of vegetation acts as kindling that will increase the intensity of a fire as it bums
through the forest creating catastrophic fires rather than low intensity bums that occur
^^Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A cultural History o f Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982) 236; 16 U.S.C. 500, 553, 556d Public Law 60-136, May 23, 1908.
Pyne 1982, 243.
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naturally at regular intervals. Fire offers a regular disturbance to the forest ecosystem.
Ecosystems recover from disturbances through the process of succession, increasing
biodiversity. The type of vegetation that occurs without disturbances decreases
biodiversity affecting wildlife, insect infestation, and disease. In this manner, suppression
policies will eventually cause more harm to the forests than the fires they are excluding.
While a national policy of suppression did dominate forest management, many
foresters understood that fire was a tool that could be used to help prevent such
catastrophes. In 1919, “A Policy of Forestry for the Nation” was presented before
forestry conferences that stated that fire protection required “an effective service for
preventing forest fires and detecting and suppressing those which may be started” .”
However, the same report went on to state that service should take “measures to reduce
inflammability o f the forests.” Among the treatments listed to do this was the use of fire
to clear brush piles, bum overs in areas protected by fire lines, and controlled bumings at
times when the climate and fuel loads were safe. This document demonstrates that while
suppression was a technique that was encouraged, fire could also be used rather than
battled to prevent loss of lives and resources.
In spite o f this knowledge, the Forest Service shared the public’s fear of forest
fires. These fears propagated a regrettable policy decision by keeping the focus on
suppression. Wildland fires were no strangers to early Americans. Historical fires of note
include: a Michigan fire in 1881 that bumed one million acres and killed over 150 people
and a Minnesota fire in 1894 that killed over 400 people’*. People were often

Henry S. Graves,“A Policy o f Forestry for the Nation.” U.S. Dept, of Agriculture Circular 148
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919) p. 6.
^^“Hisotrical Wildland Fire Statistics” National Interagency Fire Center website at
http://www.nifc.gov/stats/historica]stats.html accessed on 12 April 2004.
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overwhelmed at the sheer power and destructive force these fires wielded. As more
people moved into frontier forests, more fell victim to these holocausts, leading to a
sympathetic constituency when suppression policies were proposed. The fires of 1910
fortified the Forest Services position of total fire suppression.
The Weeks Act of 1911^^ provided funds for the USFS to acquire more forested
watersheds to protect navigable waters; however, it also allocated some funds that were
to be used for protection of those forests. Protection of the forests included protection
from fire. The funds were used to help cooperation between other federal agencies, state
organizations, and local citizens when protection was needed. Through the control of
funding, the USFS controlled national fire policy on lands beyond the federally owned
forests. The Weeks Act provided another institutional support for suppression by
providing resources for firefighting. Firefighting would continue to be a justification for
the expansion o f the Forest Service’s influence.
The National Park Service was created through the Organic Act of 1916. The
new land management agency adopted forest protection personnel and policy from the
already established Forest Service. The USFS has the expertise, the respect of the public
and politicians, and the funding. The policy o f suppression in national parks was
accepted without question.
Prior to the Park Service administration. National Parks were occupied by
military troops who acted as firefighters along with local landowners. Suppression
resources were spread thin across large expanses of land. The people inhabiting the lands
did what they could, but suppressing all fires was an impossible task. The creation of an
agency to manage these lands did little to change these circumstances.
^ The Weeks Law, 16 U.S.C. 563 Public Law 108-198, March 1, 1911
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The NPS was created to bring people to the parks. More people meant more
opportunities for fires to start (trains, smoking, camp fires) as well as a higher hazard of
what that fire could do to people and structures. However, at the time. Congress
dedicated funds to war efforts and little to the fledgling Park Service. In 1918 no monies
were allotted for fire fighting.^® The NPS did not have the expertise in fire suppression,
so managers cultivated relations with foresters, increasing the influence the USFS had on
NPS fire policy.
Fire was addressed as an unexpected emergency rather than an endemic condition
or natural process. As such, emergency funds were used to fight fires as they occurred
rather than used to provide an annual steady budget for any preventative means. The
1924 Clarke-McNary Act,^’ which gave federal assistance and grants of aid for fighting
forest fire, allowed cooperation between federal agencies and locals. The Act increased
the resources available to fight fire, but was administered through the USFS. The
influence of the USFS was further expanded through the Forest Protection Board, one of
the earlier interagency cooperation organizations that existed to coordinate activities
among federal land agencies. With William Greeley, Chief Forester of the USFS, as the
director, USFS policies and procedures were spread to other federal agencies through the
board. The Forest Protection Board existed from 1927 through 1933 when it was
superceded by efforts conducted through the New Deal. Decades later, the efforts of the
Forest Protection Board would be reinvented through the National Wildfire Coordinating
Group.

Rothman, 66.
The Clarke-McNary Act. 16 U.S.C. 568 Public Law 68-270. June 7, 1924
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The Forest Service created a policy monopoly by establishing control over the
funds and organization that oversaw fire management and protection plans. As long as it
was committed to suppression as the dominant policy, all public lands would be managed
according to that policy. Even research was controlled by the Forest Service through the
McSweeney-McNary Act o f 1928^^, which gave the Forest Service responsibility over all
federal forest research, including fire research. For most of the twentieth century the
Forest Service would deny funds for parks or programs that used fire rather than
suppressed it.
New Deal
President Franklin Roosevelt introduced the New Deal during a time when the
dominant philosophy was that humankind could conquer nature through science and
technology, including control of fire. Conservation created a large demand for work. It
was highlighted in the media and gained public momentum. With the support of the
nation, the policies o f suppression were reinforced.
One o f the New Deal programs applied to public lands was the Civilian
Conservation Corps. A large portion o f these resources were allocated through the FS.
The men in the CCC built fire towers, truck roads that allowed easier access to forest fire
control, and fire breaks. These efforts extended the reach of fire suppression into
wildlands and back country. The country’s young men were the first line of defense as
they fought fires. In many states, fire suppression fell solely on the shoulders of the CCC
as directed by the regional forester.^^

^^McSweeney-McNaryAct o f 1928. 16 U.S.C. 581
Perry H. Merrill, Roosevelt’s Forest Army: A History o f the Civilian Conservation
Corps (Barre: Northlight Studio Press, Inc., 1981) 42-53.
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CCC efforts were also directed toward visitor enhancements such as new trails
and structures. The infrastructure created during the New Deal allowed for increased
visitation throughout the following decades. The paradox of public lands is to encourage
visitation while protecting the parks from the impact of those visitors. As more guests
explored parks and forests, fire hazards also increased.
Original park and fire plans called for early recognition and suppression before
fires got big, but these plans were not feasible without adequate funding. With the New
Deal, funding and labor was available for more lookouts for quick detection. The “ 10 AM
Policy” was enacted in 1935 and held through the 1960’s^'*. This policy declared that all
fires were to be extinguished by 10 AM the morning after they were detected. The
suppression policy worked; the number of catastrophic fires declined. Technology and
free flowing resources made suppression an efficient battle.
Besides the political view that kept this policy intact and enforced, the public
supported the ideals o f suppression. Public campaigns in the 30’s, 40’s and 50’s,
including the famous Smokey Bear ads, proved to be highly effective. Youth
organizations were coordinated to spot and help suppress fires in rural districts. These
organizations included the Boy Scouts, 4-H, and Green Guards^^. In addition to the
obvious help of keeping fires out of the forest, these organizations propagated the idea
that fire was the enemy. This message was instilled in the public to the extent that the
public accused federal agencies of burning national treasures, and scorching the land and

Stephen J. Pyne, Patricia L. Andrews and Richard D. Laven, Introduction to Wildland Fire (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996) 256; Ross W. Gorte, National Forests: Current Issues and Perspectives
(Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003) 136.
” Pyne 1982, 175.
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sky when policies started to shift toward the inclusion of fire in the forests in the latter
part of the twentieth century.^^
War and Post War Influences
Our national hatred for fire deepened throughout the 40’s as it was compared to
wartime enemies^^ Fear that enemy bombs would bum our timber made any fire on
public lands a waste of valuable resources that would only benefit our enemies. At the
same time, the funds and labor needed to make suppression work were redirected toward
the war effort leaving our forests vulnerable.
As the war subsided, military technology and operations were used to combat
infernos and smoke jumpers replaced soldiers as national heroes as World War 11 came to
an end. While the aerial technology allowed suppression efforts to be more efficient in
back country areas not often visited by people, the amount of suppression resources did
not reach pre-war levels.
Post war affluence allowed more people the opportunity to explore their public
lands. However, without an increase in funds towards national parks, these areas were
stretched thin accommodating for the increased number of visitors while trying to
mitigate their impacts. More people in the parks meant more fire hazards. A reactive
policy to suppression when fires were spotted was the only way the agencies knew to
respond, but they didn’t have the army of CCC laborers anymore with which to battle
blazes.
Educating the public became the top policy for fire prevention. There was no
budget for any other form of preventative measures that would allow for the treatment of
^^Amo and Allison-Biinnell, 22-25.
37
Pyne, 1982. 176; see also David Carle, Burning Questions: America’s Fight With Nature’s Fire,
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002) 81-87; Steen, 72-73.
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lands with abnormally high fuel loads. As education reigned in human induced fires,
lightning strikes took a bigger toll. Suppression efforts were shifted deeper into wild
lands with the use of aerial technology. Extinguishing lightning ignitions in areas that
were previously inaccessible meant increasing hazardous fuel loads there.
In 1956 the NPS conceived of the Mission 66 plan; a plan to update and improve
the parks in honor of the Service’s fiftieth anniversary. Mission 66 temporarily breathed
life back into suppression with the large number of resources needed to make suppression
work. Increased roads and trails was one manifestation of this plan, but increased access
for suppression was also access for visitors who brought fire with them. As visitors and
technology increased, so too did suppression costs.
Another outcome o f the Mission 66 plan was more research in the parks led by
the scientists hired with the new funding the plan provided.^^ Although federal agencies
were not ready to change their position on fire policy away from suppression as yet, the
increased amount of collaborative research in the parks was the first step toward a
punctuated change in policy.
Changing Policv
Between the years of 1951 and 1952, Everglades National Park hired William
Robertson to do fire research at the park. By 1953, the park was conducting controlled
burning experiments. The local public accepted fire as one of the natural components
that made up the ecosystem. Due to the large amount of precipitation Florida receives,
fire was seen through a different lens of cultural symbolism. It was not the destructive
force that it appeared to be in the West. Burning continued, with public support, and in
1962 the Tall Timbers Research Station started conducting an annual series of fire
Rothman, 188.
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ecology conferences that proved to be influential. The Everglades bums were the first
time the Park Service took the initiative to explore including fire as part of natural
resource management.^^ It did not change federal policy, but it did open the door to the
possibility that suppression not be the dominant protocol.
Although burning in the Everglades did not face public outrage, conditions in the
West were different. The public wanted to protect the brush that posed the threat of a
catastrophic fire. Experimental bums were being conducted, but not on park property.
Harold Biswell was working with ranchers in Califomia - buming grazing lands to
increase feed."*® His work would extend to the conifer forests of the parks in Califomia.
The Park Service was placing an increasing importance on scientific training of its
personnel. Historically, the NPS had hired forest personnel or rangers who had come out
of schools o f forestry that placed priorities on protecting timber and wildlife without
looking at the ecological whole of how things interact. A program was created that sent
rangers back to school for scientific training."^' Additionally, the retuming veterans had
access to specialized training through the G1 Bill creating a larger pool of employees with
diverse training in a variety of scientific fields beyond traditional forestry methods. Older
bureaucrats, who were strong believers in suppression, retired and were replaced by
younger graduates with more knowledge of ecology.
Science was the catalyst for these policy shifts in the 1960’s. Studies from federal
foresters, private foresters, and scientists accumulated throughout the twentieth century.
The emerging field of ecology in the 1950’s and 1960’s confirmed what many had been

39

Pyne, 158-159.
Jan van Wagtendonk, “Dr. Bisw ell’s Influence on the Development o f Prescribed Buming in
California," (USDA Forest Service, Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158, 1995) 12.
Jim Agee interview with Hal Rothman, 10 June 2004.
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saying from the beginning: keeping fire out of the forests was a grave mistake. Research
from outside o f the park system led to the 1963 Leopold Report/^ a wildlife management
review of the parks that advised park management to manage wildlife habitat rather than
the management o f a few species, separate from their environment. The report described
fire as a natural ecological process that should be included in park management for
healthy ecosystems. Prescribed fires could be a cheap and effective way to substitute for
the fires that had been suppressed in the past. The Wilderness Act of 1964'^^ followed the
Leopold Report mandating agencies to retain a land’s primeval character as shaped by the
forces of nature, which would include fire. This law reflected a cultural change in a more
environmentally aware public who valued wild landscapes.
Following the trend of establishing wilderness areas where the forces of nature
were guaranteed to continue and the emphasis placed on ecosystem management rather
than species management, the NPS released in 1968 their administrative policies in three
separate volumes: one for natural areas; a second for recreational areas; and a third for
historical areas. The policy intended for the management of natural areas, known as the
Green Book, reiterated the Leopold Report. The Green Book gave parks the authority to
substitute fire suppression with fire inclusion. Prescribed bums were meant to restore
forests to the ecological state that would have been present if suppression had not been
forced onto the land. Policy literature saw a change in vocabulary; a shift from fire
control to fire management Hazardous fuel reduction would be a result of restoration, but

A. Starker Leopold et al., “Wildlife Management in the National Parks,” in Transactions o f the TwentvEigth North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, ed. James B. Trerethen (Washington,
D.C.: Wildlife Management Institute, 1963) 29-45.
The Wilderness Act. Public Law 88-577 (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136) September 3, 1964.
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not necessarily the main objective/^* Consequently, the 1968 lightning fires at high
elevations in Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks were allowed to bum to the
extent that they did not harm any human life or stracture. These “let bum” fires were to
become known as “prescribe natural fires”. More National Parks followed suit
throughout the next decade. The Green Book marked the beginning of a change in
federal fire policy with the NPS pioneering the way.
The new fire policy had merit beyond its ecological applications. Despite the
increased technology, costs of fighting fires were going up. The federal Office of
Management and Budget called for altemative fire mitigation m eth o d s.A lth o u g h fire
inclusion was hailed as a natural part of a forest’s dynamics, it also helped by reducing
fuel loads in forests. With a decrease in kindling, fires could be controlled and defended
against with less cost and damage.
Implementing New Poliev
During the 1970’s, this new policy of embracing fire was tested and refined.
Reintroducing fire to the forest is not an easy procedure. Forests need to be treated
before fire can be applied. With the build up of underbmsh and leaf litter, forests have
become tinderboxes where any fire, whether set by lightning or trained firefighters, can
easily get out o f control. Some parks were still nervously avoided letting fire loose in the
park while others experimented with bum plans and conditions in order to implement the
new policy without sacrificing the lands they were charged with protecting. Yosemite,
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks pioneered fire policy in the West while
Everglades National Parks continued fire ecology research in the East.
Cordon Cooper Olson, “A History o f Natural Resource Management within the National Park Service,’'
(thesis. Slippery Rock University, 1986).
Amo and Allison-Burmell, 23.
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In addition to the concerns associated with re-establishing fire in the forests, new
laws were in place that put further restraints on what bum plans were possible. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 stated that certain procedures were
required, including public input, for plans that were to have a significant impact on
federal lands."*^ Fire programs would be subject to NEPA protocols. The NPS had to find
a way to communicate to the public that fire was a benefit to natural areas to avoid
conflicts that could be brought up in the NEPA process. This task proved to be difficult
because public opinion was strongly influenced by the anti-fire campaigns from the early
part o f the century. The difficulty was in convincing the public that fire was a benign
presence. Even traditional supporters of the park service were upset by the visual of
bumt trees, though they understood the logic behind the fires."^’ The public was also
concemed with smoke and the potential problems with air quality as a result of these
bums. The 1979 Ouzel fire in Colorado brought suits from the citizens of Boulder with
regard to air quality concems."*^
Originally, the term for prescribed natural fires was “let bum,” but the public felt
that it seemed like too easual a stance for the NPS to take on something as dangerous as
fire. Prescribed Natural Fire set more of a tone that the park officials were attentively
managing the fire. There was also an educational component needed to reassure the
public regarding the difference between Prescribed Natural Fires, which are ignited by
lightning, and prescribed bums, which are lit by management. There was uneasiness
about allowing something nature started and purposefully buming forests. Prescribed
bums were sold as replacing a natural process.
The NEPA Act o f 1969. Public Law 91-190 (42 U.S. C. 4321-4347) January 1, 1970.
Rothman, 256.
Rothman, 312
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The experimental period allowed parks to pursue more structure and consistency
among park fire plans. The 1977 Fire Management Policy, referred to as NPS 18, gave
some parameters to guide parks with their individual plans, but it was still a loose
philosophy rather than a detailed plan. The revisions to the fire management policy
throughout the 70’s were attempts to centralize the policy and minimize park liability,
however the variability between park lands required variations in plans.
The parks stayed dedicated to the new model of fire management. Interagency
cooperation increased and, the prescribed bum plans were adopted by other agencies. The
Forest Service made an official change in policy in 1978.
There was a trend to consolidate and centralize suppression efforts for wildfires
on or near federal lands. The NPS joined the Boise Fire Interagency center (which
changes its name to National Interagency Fire Center in 1993 to better reflect its mission)
during this time period, establishing a more consistent response to wildfire suppression
across all federal land agencies."^® Because suppression efforts required large
mobilization efforts and large costs, the NPS implemented FIREPRO in 1982.^*^ This
program mode forecasted where fire suppression resources will be needed from year to
year based on past fire histories and weather trends.^'
The interagency suppression efforts would be tested in 1988 with fires in
Yellowstone. The fires in Yellowstone started as prescribed natural fires, but unusually
bad conditions spread the fire farther and faster than anticipated. The dry, windy

NIFC website, “Mission and History o f the National Interagency Fire Center,
http://www.nifc.gov/nifcmiss.html. accessed on 16 March 2005.
50
Rothman, 299.
51
National Park Service Reference Manual 18: Wildland Fire Management, Chapter 17: FIREPRO
Analysis, available online at http://www.nps.gov/fire/download/fir wil rml8 chl7.pdf. accessed 20 April
2005.
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conditions led to many fires within the park and in adjacent lands. The blazes were
declared wildfires and every effort was made to suppress them, but conditions were
perfect for quick combustion and suppression efforts were ineffective. In all, 1.4 million
acres, more than 50% o f the park, burned over four months time.

Gateway

communities were threatened by the conflagrations, which resulted in a loss of their
support for PNF programs. Bambi was also re-released in theaters in 1988, sparking
sympathy for scorched woodland creatures from a whole new generation of Americans.
The loss o f the public’s support pushed fire from a matter of science to that of politics.
Fear of another holocaust resulted in an increase in suppression as the “better safe than
sorry” policy. All prescribed natural fires and many prescribed bums were called off until
the Yellowstone fire review was released and parks brought their own plans into
compliance with the review. The NPS was under scmtiny and political attack. The 1989
Final Report on Fire Management Policy^^ was the result of the NPS investigation of
those fires.
The Yellowstone fires were followed by a combustible decade with the loss of
many acres and firefighters. While the fires of the 1990’s were destmctive and tragic, the
NPS stood by its science-based policy allowing fire on the land, tmsting that the public
would fall in line if they understood the dynamics of fire ecology. 1994 brought 34
deaths in the South Canyon fire leading to the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management
Policy, which called for reaffirmation of park fire plans. Parks had plans but they were

Rothman, 351
“Final Report on Fire Management Policy” USD A, DOI May 5, 1989
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vague or not being implemented. The 1995 policy required detailed prescriptions and
contingency plans in case of wildfires.
In 1995 the National Park Service introduced five member teams known as
Prescribed Fire Support Modules to mitigate risks involved with prescription bum
programs. These modules are mobile tactical support teams trained exclusively for onsite
management o f prescribed bums. They specialize in managed bums to the extent that
they are unavailable for wildfire response. These modules travel to parks with active
bum programs.
Despite the consolidation of suppression resources, the last ten years have seen
horrible fire seasons from the deaths of the 1994 season to the 2002 blazes in Southem
Califomia that led to numerous fatalities and the destmction of more than 3,500
stmctures.^^ During this same time, two new plans were released: the National Fire Plan
(NFP) of 2000^^ and the Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy in 2001^’. The National Fire Plan is simply a reaction to the large
fires that have become common during fire seasons. The NFP addresses firefighting
safety, rehabilitation of the land, accountability, fuels reduction, and community
assistance in the form of education and training. Fire plans of the last decade stress
human safety and fuel reduction as a main objective rather than ecological restoration,
especially as populations in the WUl continue to rise. The 2001 update was a response to
the Cerro Grande fire. It found that the 1995 policy was sound, but that parks were still

Federal Wildland Fire Policy, available online at http://www.fs.fed.us/land/wdfire3.htm. accessed on
May 12, 2005.
Rachel Brittin, “Millions o f Fires Burned” American Forests 109 (4): 31.
The National Fire Plan, available online at http://www.fireplan.gov. accessed on May 12, 2005.
National Interagency Fire Center, Review and Update o f the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management
Policy, Boise, ID: Bureau o f Land Management Office o f Fire and Aviation, 2001.

32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

battling the effects o f years o f suppression and still do not have plans that meet current
policy standards.
One problem with fire policy is that while suppression efforts are consolidated for
more effieient response to wildfires, preventative plans to treat land remain in the domain
of individual parks. These preventative measures do not receive the same resources as
suppression efforts. This keeps the fire policy dominantly one of suppression still since
individual parks do not have the resources or ineentives to update and implement fire
plans. There will always be that outlier; that large fire that cannot be forecasted or
managed and which uses up large amounts of resources as it spreads across the land.
Knowing that an unaccountable large fire is possible keeps fire policy one of fear, and
thus one o f suppression by default
The National Park Serviee’s fire poliey has evolved in a fashion similar to that
expected by the punctuated equilibrium theory. A self-defeating policy o f wildfire
suppression held strong for the better part of century. The new policy regime was created
more than thirty years ago, but still many field offices have not implemented the
corresponding fire plans. A eloser look at how Yosemite National Park’s fire plan
formed will identify if the punctuated equilibrium pattern is repeated at the park level.
Using Yosemite as a case study will also identify what events instigated the change in
daily practiees at the field offiee level once the federal policy changed. A catalyst for
change was needed at the federal level to approve funding needed for forest management
that included fire as part of the plan, but a second catalyst is also needed to implement the
new poliey at the local level.
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Yosemite: A case study of field level operations
During its early history, Yosemite’s fire policies were not extraordinary; however, the
fire plans created and refined at Yosemite in the 1970’s became the foundation for NPS
policies that followed. Those policies in turn shaped the federal fire policies throughout
public land agencies.
As the original government stewards of the park, the army was charged with
protecting the forests from fire. While this duty was understood, it was often out of their
hands since there were neither men nor equipment available to actively eradicate fire
from the area. Local citizens often lent a hand to fight fires when it threatened their
interests. Reports from acting superintendents mentioned that while they tried to control
fire, it was an unrealistic objective. The reports also noted that fires were noticed to cause
no significant damage to the forests and recommended that the traditional light buming
previously done by natives in the area be re-introduced.^* The reeommendation was not
taken.
When the NPS took over control of the land, the ideals of suppression were
practiced at Yosemite as much as resources allowed. After twenty years in the Forest
Service John D. Coffman visited the park in 1928 as the new NPS fire control expert to
take stock o f what resources were available and make suggestions that would allow the
park to live up to the demands of suppression^^. Recommendations for equipment were

Report o f the Acting Superintendent and Special Inspector J.W. Zevely recommendations to Secretary of
the Interior, 1898. On file in the Yosemite National Park Research Library in the museum in Yosemite
Village. Report o f the Acting Superintendent Capt. Will Cox, Washington GPO:1899. Report o f the Acting
Superintendent, Lt. Col. Jos. Garrard, Washington GPO:1903. Report o f the Acting Superintendent Capt.
H.C. Benson, Washonton GPO:1905.
John Coffman, interview by Amelia Fry, Bancroft Library, University o f Califomia Berkeley Oral
History Project, National Park Service, US Dept, o f Interior, iii.
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made, plans were revised and trainings were held for p e r s o n n e l . T h e next year saw a
low number o f acres burned, illustrating that suppression works when proper resources
are available.®' The following years brought the CCC with all of its resources to
Yosemite where suppression efforts were actively pursued. As suppression was the main
policy for the NPS, it was also the default policy for Yosemite until the official change of
national policy with the release of the Green Book in 1968.
The significant factor that allowed Yosemite to become a future leader in fire
policy is its proximity to University o f California at Berkeley where Harold Biswell
studied fire ecology with his students. Biswell came to California in the late 1940’s
where he worked with experimental range buming to increase feed for ranchers. He
began experimenting with fire in pine forests in Lake and Madera Counties in 1951, and
started prescribed bum studies at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Park with his
students in 1965.®^ Biswell spoke at Yosemite National Park the next year, introducing
the park staff to prescribed bum programs. The nearby research and close collaboration
between institutions put Yosemite in the right position to take advantage of the change in
policy that came in 1968.
At the same time as the federal policy change, Robert Barbee was hired at
Yosemite National Park as a resource manager. Barbee had accepted a program offered
by the NPS that allowed employees to go back to graduate school in an effort to train
them to think along the lines of the Leopold Report. Upon graduation from Colorado
State University, he was sent to Yosemite to write the first natural resource management
plan. His role as a natural resource manager made him an active figure in prescribed
“ John Coffman, Memo for Acting Superintendent Leavitt, July 31, 1928. El Portal Archives.
Leavitt, Superintendent’s Armual Reports 1929, El Portal Archive.
Van Wagtendonk 1995, 12.

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

buming. He worked in collaboration with personnel at Sequoia-Kings Canyon National
Park, Harry Schimke at Stanislaus National Forest, and Harold Biswell. His association
with these fire advocates inspired him to make sure that prescribed fire were
implemented as part of natural resource management at Yosemite National Park.®*
One o f Biswell’s students, Jan van Wagtendonk, created prescriptions for
prescribed bums at Yosemite for his dissertation.®'' The first prescribed bum plan was
included as part of the park’s Environmental Restoration Program in 1970.®® Van
Wagtendonk was hired upon his graduation in 1972 to implement his research and create
prescribed natural bum zones and condition requirements under which naturally ignited
fires would be allowed to bum. In doing so, van Wagtendonk wrote the agency’s first
comprehensive prescribed fire plan for Yosemite. The plan included prescribed bums
ignited by park personnel to achieve management objectives of ecological restoration.
By 1974, 2700 acres had been bumed at Yosemite by prescription.
Originally the superintendent and forest managers at the park were not committed
to a policy that would release fire amongst their trees. They did not initially welcome
Barbee as a newcomer with new ideas that went against tradition forest practices. But as
Jim Agee, another one o f Biswell’s students, mentions in an interview, “Bob (Barbee)
really pushed the program.. .Bob kept pushing, and Bob kept buming.®®” Barbee was
creative about securing resources for the program. When he needed manpower to ensure
responsible coverage of a bum he tumed to the Califomia Conservation Corps, which is a

Robert Barbee, interview with Hal Rothman, November 12, 2004.
Jan Van Wagtendonk, “Fire and Fuel Relationships in Mixed Conifer Ecosystems o f Yosemite” (Ph.D.
diss., UC Berkeley, 1972).
Robert D. Barbee, “Environmental Restoration Program for Yosemite National Park”, NPS, DOI: 1970.
^ Jim Agee, interview with Hal Rothman, June 10, 2004.
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program run through the California prison system that supplies other agencies with labor
for forest management programs®^.
The 1974 Starr King fire was considered a success of the prescribed natural fire
program. The fire was ignited by lightning in a high elevation part of the park that was
designated a prescribed natural fire zone and bumed for months. Policy dictated that the
fire be allowed to bum itself out unless it came close to the zone boundary or conditions
changed making it too dangerous to allow the fire to continue. The Starr King fire
approached the fire zone boundary and suppression efforts were used to contain the fire,
but not extinguish it. The fire bumed itself out a few months later with little damage and
no animosity from the public. ®* Subsequent fires that bumed to the edge of the 1974 fire
went out due to lack o f fuel. ®^ The Starr King fire was considered a success of the
prescribed natural fire program.
It was easy to use Yosemite’s fire plan as an illustration of success. They had no
large fires threaten people or structures at this time.^° Prescribed and natural prescribed
fires that exemplified the agency’s new embrace of fire were buming within conditions
and without complaints. Park staff was united behind the policy and educated the public
on the importance of fire within the park.
Yosemite continued to lead fire plans with the extent of detail in its prescriptions
and responsibilities. As more parks attempted to write their fire plans in accordance with
the Green Book, they looked for guidance to the parks that were actively practicing

^’Robert Barbee, interview with Hal Rothman, November 4, 2004.
Jan Van Wagtendonk, “Wilderness Fire Management in Yosemite National Park” in Earthcare: Global
Protection o f the Fourteenth Biennial Wilderness Conference. Edited by Edmund A. Schofield (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1978) 324-335.
® Jan Van Wagtendonk, “Large Fires in Wilderness Areas” (USDA Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-GTR-320, 1993).
Superintendent William N. Burgen, memo to Regional Director o f Western Region, El Portal Work
Center/Warehouse, Fire Records. 1977
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prescribed bums.

As Yosemite’s research scientist, Van Wagtendonk was requested to

lend expertise to other parks that were forming their own plan.
Yosemite reviewed its fire program in 1977. While prescribed bums were
addressed in the Natural Resource Management Plan,’' the Forest Fire Management
Plan” outlined suppression efforts in the park. This division of fire plans demonstrates
the division o f thinking throughout the agency. Fire was invited back into the park with
outlined prescriptions, but suppression was still the fall back policy because suppression
still had funding that exceeded that of prescribed buming. The philosophy of prescribed
buming was that with enough treatment, future fire management would consist only of
protection of people and stmctures like an urban fire station since natural fires would
bum themselves out due to low fuels. However, the funding was not available to tmly
test if this belief was realistic.
Part o f the reluctance to fully engage in an aggressive prescribe fire program was
the reaction from the public. A 1975 prescribed fire bumed for three months, much
longer than had been planned. Despite the fact that no people or communities were
threatened, the smoke did cause some alarm among local residents. ’* The park staff
knew that public backing was significant to the program and used education efforts to
keep visitors aware of fire plans and ecology. In the 1979 Natural, Conditional, and
Prescribed Fire Management Plan, Van Wagtendonk mentions how cluttered forests
inhibit visitor enjoyment, thus tying park guests to resource management. Significant
tourist attractants were given a higher level of fire protection. For instance, the Grizzly
Yosemite National Park Natural Resource Management Plan and Environmental Assessment, El Portal
Work Center/Warehouse, Fire Records. 1977 .
Forest Fire Management Plan Revised. El Portal Work Center/Warehouse. Fire Records. 1977
Letter to Rep. BF Sisk from Super Leslie Amberger El Portal Work Center/W arehouse. Fire Records.
1975,
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Giant in the Mariposa Grove was afforded permanent protection from bums and scars.
Many o f the Sequoias were allowed only a small amount of scarring so that visitors
would not worry about blackened marks on the trees they had traveled so far to marvel.
Due to the distance and difference between parks, there was a certain amount of
autonomy and decentralized organization in the national parks. However, Yosemite
depended on interagency suppression efforts during Labor Day weekend in 1987 with the
Stanislaus Complex Fire. The fire started in the adjacent forest lands but threatened park
land and nearby communities of El Portal and Foresta, so park staff was sent to fight that
fire in addition to the fires buming concurrently within the park. A large mobilization
effort was provided by the Boise Interagency Fire Center to contain the fire.
The dry conditions of 1987 caused more fire activity in the park than any other
time in park history. Prescribed bums were cancelled for the ’87 and ’88 seasons’®. The
drought conditions were prevalent throughout the West and resulted in the catastrophic
fires in Yellowstone. While the Yellowstone fires were under review, all prescribed
natural fires were suppressed throughout the National Park Service. Despite the scmtiny
placed on the NPS, Yosemite went ahead with its prescribed bum plans 1989, and was
one of only three parks back online with prescribed natural fires in 1990’®. While the rest
of service was timid about allowing fires to bum in the parks, Yosemite, Sequoia and
Kings Canyon National Parks were responsible for 95% of the prescribed natural bums in

Super John Morehead. “letter to Norman Christensen at Duke University” El Portal Work
CenterAVarehouse, Fire Records. 1986.
1992 Cumulative Record o f Prescribed Bums-Yosemite National Park. Dates from 1970 to 1991. El
Portal archives. Y1421 1992.
Jan van Wagtendonk, “Large Fires in Wilderness Areas”, Gen.Tech. Rep. INT-GTR-320, Ogden, UT,
1993. David J. Parsons and Stephen J. Botti, “Restoration o f Fire in National Parks”, Gen. Tech. Rep. INTGTR-341.
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the park service from 1988 to 1992.” This commitment to the fire program distinguished
Yosemite from other parks.
In 1990, Yosemite experienced its own version of the Yellowstone conflagration
that had occurred two years earlier. A lightning strike ignited the A-Rock fire and
because o f the experience in Yellowstone, suppression efforts were immediately called
into action at Yosemite. These suppressive measures were ineffective at containing the
fire due to dry conditions and winds. Yosemite Valley and El Portal were evacuated and
the park was closed for the first time in its history. Over 18,000 acres were bumed,
including several stmctures.’* This was a highly publicized event, but it did not diminish
Yosemite’s commitment to restoring fire to the land. The 1994 Draft Statement for
Management’^ illustrated the park’s continued dedication by zoning 80% of the park for
conditional buming.
The Draft Statement for Management did raise a concem that air quality
regulations would dampen the fire program. The current Fire Management Plan for
Yosemite National Park completed in 2004*® repeats this concem that compliance with
local and state air quality standards restricts fire policies. Open communication lines for
public education and feedback are used to mitigate visitor concems.
The increasing populations along the wildemess fringe areas raise additional
concems. Using prescribed fire to treat fuel loads in these areas risks stmcture and

Bruce M. Kilgore and Tom Nichols, “National Park Service Fire Policies and Programs,” in James K.
Brown, Robert W. Mutch, Charles W. Spoon, and Ronald H. Wakimoto, “Proceedings: Symposium on Fire
in Wildemess and Park Management,” (Missoula: USDA Forest Service, General Technical Report, INTGTR-320, 1995), 24-27.
^ National Park Service, Western Region “Yosemite Fires, 1990”. El Portal Work CenterAVarehouse, Fire
Records. 1990.
1994 Draft Statement Management, YNP, NPS, DOI
Final Yosemite Fire Management Plan and Enviroiunental Impact Statement
('http://www.nps.gov/vose/planning/fire/J accessed May 12, 2005.
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human safety. The 2004 plan requires mechanically thinning developed areas before, or
as a substitute to, buming in order to reduce the risk to lives or property. However, it
does not support the Healthy Forest Initiative*' that allows sales of these materials to
support the efforts. It also states that no new roads will be built for access to the park
interior for fire response or fuel reductions.
Yosemite National Park remains a leader in fire management policy and research
over thirty years after the Green Book authorized it to restore fire to the ecosystem.
Federal policy reviews of the last decade have urged parks to reaffirm and strengthen
their fire plans while citing Yosemite as an example of a compliant park. Despite the
1990 A-Rock fire, Yosemite has not had a fire threat challenge its commitment to fire
restoration in the park. Yosemite’s impetus to initiate its fire plan and keep it thriving
came from the government and education research institutions located nearby in
Berkeley. Yosemite highlights the ecological importance of fire while maintaining public
safety rather than stressing fuel reduction as the key significance of the plan.

Healthy Forests Restoration Act o f 2003. Public Law 108-148, December 2003.
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION
This section describes the patterns illustrated in the policy histories described
above and compares them to the pattern of punctuated equilibrium. The catalysts that
caused the jumps to new equilibrium are identified and discussed.

Federal Fire Policy
The federal fire policy evolution does follow the punctuated equilibrium pattern.
The federal policy pattern is illustrated in Figure 2 with the policy of suppression shown
as the original equilibrium and fire management plans that include fire as the new
equilibrium. In order for a policy to reach equilibrium, policy institutions and
monopolies must be in place to reinforce that course of action in the face of resistance.
The Forest Service created a policy monopoly for fire suppression with acts of
Congress that established institutional arrangements and networks that controlled funding
for forestry research and management under the condition that fire was to be excluded
completely. The bureaucratic organization of the agencies gave the policy momentum.
Personnel in land management agencies came from similar training backgrounds that
focused on timber production rather than forest ecology. Public campaigns, like Smokey
Bear, further justified the mission of extinguishing every fire on public lands. While
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suppression was not a practical policy for the long term, appropriations from Congress
and programs like the CCC and Mission 66 did make the policies economically feasible.
The punctuated change in policy occurred within the National Park Service. The
differing missions of the agencies were significant. While the Forest Service was
preoccupied with protecting the trees, the National Park Service’s wildlife division began
viewing the forests from a more holistic lens provided by the Leopold Report. The
publicly supported experimental bums in Florida and Biswell’s bums in Califomia
proved that bums could be beneficial and manageable. The enthusiasm from these
researchers and the scholarship they produced were catalysts for a drastic policy change.
The punctuation resulted in a new policy that requires the inclusion of fire as part
of a management plan in areas that have historically experienced fire disturbances. The
new policy has been scmtinized and shown to be supported by new policy networks;
proving that it is at a new equilibrium.
Scmtinizing process was motivated by the risk of prescribed buming. Prescribed
fires have resulted in several high profile fires over the last decade. The fires were
followed by reviews of the federal policies that authorized and encouraged the purposeful
setting of fire by land managers. The 1989 Final Report of Fire Management Policy, a
response to the 1988 Yellowstone fires that grew from prescribed natural fires, and stood
by the policy that prescribed bums were a sound treatment option for areas with
excessive fuel loads. The report also highlighted parks like Yosemite, with its bum
treatment policies, as benchmarks for other park superintendents. The 1995 Federal
Wildland Fire Policy released by the National Interagency Fire Center expanded the
policy to all federally managed lands by stating that the use of fire should be used as a
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tool for land management. The 2000 National Fire Plan increases the options available
for fuel treatment to include mechanical, chemical, or biological control methods in
addition to fire, but fire is still a necessary step as part of the ecological restoration
process. A review and update of the 1995 policy was called for in reaction to the 2000
Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico. This fire grew from a prescribed bum that escaped
the control of the fire managers onsite. Although the escaped fire demonstrated the great
risk that can come from prescription programs, the updated federal policy continued to
support the notion that prescribed bum programs were “sound.” The risk of losing
control o f bums was due to the result of the suppression policy that prescribed bum
programs were designed to correct.
In addition to the standing up to these investigations, new policy institutions were
created that supported the developing policy. The Prescribed Fire Support Modules
created specifically to aid prescription bum programs are an example of these programs.
The interagency organization of the federal fire plan through the National Interagency
Fire Center and the National Wildfire Coordinating Group strengthened the policy
network, and made the National Park Service’s fire policies repeated throughout the
nation. In addition to the National Park Service, the other land management agencies
cooperating through these organizations include: the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National
Association of State Foresters, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
These institutional arrangements allow for program funding and interagency
cooperation, which reinforce the new policy of fuel management and resists arguments
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for alternative policies thus indicating that the new policy has reached a stable
equilibrium, which has lasted for over 30 years.

Yosemite’s Fire Policy
Yosemite’s policy evolution also follows a punctuated equilibrium pattern, as
shown in Figure 3. Yosemite’s management policies were established following the
problem definition of suppression prior to the 1970’s, so the original policy equilibrium is
the same for both policy histories; however, the catalysts for the punctuations differ
between the two levels o f the agency’s organization.
The official change in governing policy was released in 1968, but there was
neither infirastructure nor expertise in place at Yosemite to take advantage of this change.
However, the policy change did open a few doors for Yosemite. It allowed access to the
park for local researchers from the University of California to do experimental bums, and
it opened a position for Robert Barbee who would be a significant agent in implementing
the policy. Barbee made sure there were resources to allow for safe bums and used
professional networks to build a local coalition for prescribe buming. With colleagues,
Barbee held fire demonstrations for media and professionals and the public. These
demonstrations acted as educational tools to dissuade any opposition or fear.
The university research led to the placement of Jan van Wagtendonk, who would
not only have the knowledge to create a prescribed bum plan, but who would also
continue to sustain the policy. The presence of the expertise, along with a supportive
supervisor, instigated the change in park practices.
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Supporting institutions for the new policy at Yosemite include the interpretive
plans that work similar to the Smokey Bear campaigns of the last century. Visitor and
stakeholder education programs are part of the fire management plan.^^ The first
prescribed bums were done in the Valley in full view of the visitors. By putting the fires
in the public’s view, Yosemite invited questions that would lead to informed answers that
would assure the public that fire belonged in the park.
The legacy o f being a fire park has separated Yosemite from other national parks,
which has created the political momentum to sustain the program. New superintendents
to the park have an inffastracture in place that allows them to continue the process of
securing funds and approving bums. No new catalyst is needed to maintain the program
since it has reached equilibrium.
The stability o f the policy was tested when the entire National Park Service’s fire
policies were scmtinized following the Yellowstone fires. While the Yellowstone fires
gained notoriety much like the 1910 fires, they had little effect on the policies at
Yosemite National Park. At the time, all prescribed natural fires were disallowed until
individual park fire plans could be reviewed and updated. Yosemite’s fire plan was one
of the first approved, and prescribed natural fires and prescribed bums continued without
intermption.^^ Jan van Wagtendonk confirmed in a phone interview that while conditions
for bums did become stricter, the Yellowstone fires had no impact on the Yosemite fire
program.^"^

Yosemite Fire Management Program accessed at http://www.nps.gov/vose/planning/fire/
on June 5*'', 2005.
Final Report on Fire Management Policy 1989; paper stating pb that continued. Jan van Wagtendonk,
“Large Fires in Wilderness Areas. 1995 Gen Tech Rep INT GTR 320.
^ Jan van Wagtendonk, phone interview with author on August 8^, 2005.
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Yosemite fire policy also matches the punctuated equilibrium pattern as shown in
Figure 3. While suppression is also represented as the initial equilibrium in this figure as
it was in Figure 2 for the federal fire policy, a different set of events is shown to instigate
the change in park practices, only beginning with the 1968 change in federal policy. The
catalyst for change at the park level was brought about through new personnel who were
enthusiastically motivated and had the necessary expertise needed to implement the
policy change. Once park practices changed to include the implementation of the new
plan, the organizational momentum of policy maintained that plan as a new equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
The punctuated equilihrium model of policy evolution describes this case of fire
policy on public lands. Moreover, the punctuated equilibrium pattern can be seen at both
federal and local levels. Punctuated Equilibrium occurs regardless of the size or scope of
the organization, but separate catalysts to cause change at the different level of
organization are needed.
Significant catalysts at the local level include personal preference of field level
managers to recruit the expertise needed to develop an infrastructure that will implement
and maintain the practices required to fulfill the new policy. The park superintendent is
also important for securing fuel treatment resources from larger agency funding pools.
Without a motivated supervisor, bum plans would quickly wither for lack o f resources.
When a new policy is created for an agency, motivation for the park-level managers
should also be created to insure the policy is implemented in daily practices. That
motivation can be supplied through promotions and/or transfers to parks needed to
implement the policy. Sufficient funds need to be available to these managers assuming
that all the parks will follow the new directive. If there are only enough funds in
FIREPRO for a few parks to have active bum plans, it follows reason that the other parks
do not have to implement programs since there aren’t funds available. Appropriating
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sufficient funds communicates to supervisor’s that this is not a symbolic policy, but an
actual order for the agency director.
While support from local citizens or constituency groups did not provide the
impetus for a change in park practices at Yosemite, citizen groups did not block bum
programs as seen in other parks. This support can be attributed to the comprehensive
educational component o f Yosemite’s fire plan or to the fact that the park has not yet
experienced a bum on the same scale as Yellowstone’s 1988 fires.
Future work with policy evolution pattems should continue to do case study
analyses o f other parks with differing levels of activity in their bums plans to identify
which catalysts have changed policies at the different sites. Additionally, one could look
at sites where a change in park practices was initiated hut failed to see what obstacles
inhibit potential catalysts for change. Use of land, mission of agency, personnel, and
public involvement should still be looked at in these cases to determine their involvement
in policy evolution or stagnation.
Recommendations for implementing policies quickly would have to take into
consideration these future studies that identify the catalysts for park level policy change.
It is significant to note that influences from outside the agency were cmcial in creating
the punctuation in both case studies discussed in this paper. If future studies illustrate
that involvement from local organizations is consistent with policy implementation, then
higher level managers will need to incorporate public involvement into the policy
stmcture. There are several ways in which the public can get involved in agency planning
through NEPA scoping periods and stakeholder meetings, but there must be an active
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local organization for these events to work. Perhaps there should be some form of
incentive in the policy itself that would enroll from local institutions and civil groups.
Yosemite was case where fire plans were spread out to the rest of the National
Park Service laterally rather than from top down. Instead of a directive from higher level
managers, Yosemite’s plans were used as a template and modeled to fit other parks. The
plan was adapted as it was shown to he a success and the expertise and budgeting for it
made clear to other parks. It would be worth trying to see if plans should be implemented
through “flagship” parks. Send a directive that one park must implement the plan. Give
that park resources, personnel, etc. to make implementation possible. That park can work
the application of the policy and organizational infrastructure needed to put the policy
into practice. Once the foundation for the policy is set, it can be shared with other parks.
There would be some time delay, but this method might get a policy in place faster.
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